A flawed notion of freedom

Philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau has a very flawed notion of freedom. In his bizarre conception, Rousseau argues that true freedom can only exist within the collective, intermixed wills of the people themselves, which ultimately manifests itself, or finds its highest political expression, in a mysterious conception of an emergent “General Will.” This “General Will”, the entire essence of Rousseau’s view of liberty, is a new corporate entity which takes on a new life of its own through the transfer of all individual rights to the collective body politic, which is omniscient, omnipotent and infallible.

According to Rousseau, this General Will may never be incorrect, wrong or mistaken under any circumstances; indeed, it is always right–and must therefore always be obeyed, also under any circumstances, so long as it actually remains the General Will proper and not some manifestation of special interests. There are no natural restraints placed upon the General Will.

Once the individual formally agrees to enter into the social contract (society) and gives his complete consent, he automatically becomes wholly politically obligated to the state, which includes not only his own “particular,” self-interested will, but the collective wills of all the other citizens as well. This collection and intricate calculus of particular wills form the General Will–the entire basis for political obligation and freedom, according to Rousseau.

Thus, when Rousseau claims that the social contract forces people to be free, he is alluding precisely to a “General Will” that holds the common good, or the good of all, to be supreme, all-powerful, infallible. By conforming to this General Will, the individual is forced to be against his own self interest, which allegedly makes him free, because true freedom can only rest with this peculiar intermixing of wills, since Rousseau regards liberty as a positive construct extending quite beyond the mere absence of restraint. To Rousseau, liberty is a product essentially manufactured through the intricate mutual cancellations of particular wills, which, taken together, form the almighty General Will.

Mr. Rousseau arrives at this positive concoction of liberty through the “realization” that no morality, duty, right, or obligation could possibly exist in the state of nature (pre-government). According to Rousseau, because no one recognizes any code of ethics in the state of nature–and because no one can be beholden to himself–no morality can rightly be said to exist. Morality, he maintained, arrives only through the establishment of social conventions, via the General Will.

Thus, freedom, morality and rights are all positively determined by the General Will. They did not exist prior to the establishment of Mr. Rousseau’s social contract. Freedom is created by the General Will and none other. It is whatever the General Will decides it shall be. And since Rousseau refuses to separate morality from politics, morality is also the exclusive province of the sovereign General Will. Individual rights are defined by the sovereign, and remain valid so long as they apply equally to all: “In the state of society,” declared Rousseau, “all rights are fixed by law.” In other words, under this bizarre socialist concoction, you and I have no rights–except those rights which a democratic government allows us (and can revoke, by popular vote, at any time).
Some rights. Some freedom.