Developing a meaningful executive function at the UN

We took a break over the last two weeks on the series on the United Nations, but will resume this week. So far we’ve addressed five steps needed to strengthen the General Assembly, namely, 1. Raising minimum requirements for membership; 2. Appointing a commission to study borders and frontiers; 3. Searching for new financial arrangements; 4. Making a commitment to a universal auxiliary language and a common script; and 5. Investigating the possibility of a single international currency.

This week, the following excerpt from Turning Point of All Nations outlines steps required to developing a meaningful executive function

At the international level, the single most important executive function is the enforcement of a collective security pact.

Collective security implies a binding covenant among nations to act in concert against threats to the collective. The effectiveness of the covenant depends on the degree to which members commit themselves to the collective good, even if motivated by a sense of enlightened self-interest.

Within the United Nations, the enforcement role is largely carried out by the Security Council, with other functions of the executive being shared with the Secretariat. Both are hampered in fulfilling their mandated roles. The Security Council suffers from an inability to take decisive action. The Secretariat is pressured by the complex demands of the member states.

In the short term, four practical measures are possible to strengthen the executive function within the United Nations.

[B]1. Limiting the exercise of the veto power[/B]

The original intention of the UN Charter in conferring veto power on the five Permanent Members was to prevent the Security Council from authorizing military actions against a Permanent Member or requiring the use of its forces against its will. In fact, beginning with the Cold War, the veto power has been exercised repeatedly for reasons that have to do with regional or national security.

A 1955 submission on UN reform… argued for the gradual elimination of the concepts of “permanent membership” and “veto power” as confidence in the Security Council would build. Today, forty years later, we reaffirm that position. However, we also propose that, as a transitionary step, measures be introduced to curb the exercise of the veto power to reflect the original intention of the Charter.

[B]2. Institutionalizing ad hoc military arrangements[/B]

To support the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations, and to add credibility to resolutions of the Security Council, an International Force should be created. Its loyalty to the UN and its independence from national considerations must be assured. The command and control of such a fully armed Force would reside with the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. Its finances, however, would be determined by the General Assembly. In constructing such a force, the Secretary-General would seek to draw competent personnel from all regions of the world.

If properly implemented, this Force would also provide a sense of security that might encourage steps toward global disarmament, thereby making possible an outright ban on all weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, in line with the principle of collective security, it would become gradually understood that states need only maintain armaments sufficient for their own defense and the maintenance of internal order.

As an immediate step toward the establishment of this Force, the present system of ad hoc arrangements could be institutionalized to establish core regional forces for rapid deployment during a crisis.

[B]3. Applying the notion of collective security to other problems of the global commons[/B]

Although originally conceived within the context of a threat of military aggression, the principle of collective security, some argue, may now be applied in an expansive manner to all threats which, although apparently local in nature, are actually the result of the complex breakdown of the present-day global order. These threats include but are not limited to international drug trafficking, food security, and the emergence of new global pandemics.

We believe this issue would have to be included on the agenda of the proposed Global Summit. However, it is unlikely that expansive formulations of collective security would preclude the fundamental cause of military aggression.

[B]4. Retaining successful UN institutions with independent executive function[/B]

Some of the more independent organizations within the UN family, such as the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the International Telegraph and Communications Union, the International Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization, have enjoyed conspicuous success with focused but important areas of international concern.

Generally, these organizations already have their own executive function. Their independence should be retained and reinforced as part of the international executive.

[I](David Khorram, MD is a board certified ophthalmologist and director of Marianas Eye Institute. Comments and questions are welcome. Call 235-9090 or email him through www.MarianasEye.com. Copyright © 2006 David Khorram)[/I]